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Abstract
Sea minefields obstructing naval missions have to be breached with minimum effort and
acceptable risk. With the advent of autonomous mapping, it is feasible to have high quality
information of obstructing sea minefields and their environment before moving into them.
The challenge remains to use this knowledge optimally to minimise risk, time and effort in
crossing the sea minefield. To achieve this, two interlinked processes are required, consisting
of finding the shortest route with acceptable risk or route with minimum risk through the
sea minefield, and if no route of acceptable risk exists, removing the optimum combination
of sea mines to create a route of acceptable risk. This paper describes the use of Dijkstra’s
Algorithm and a genetic algorithm to achieve practical strategies and a method in which two
optimisation techniques interact to provide a safe route considering the risk of both the sea
mine and the environment and making it applicable to sea mine avoidance. This methodology
may readily be applied to general ship routing in risk areas and may be expanded to routing
through any area where no known routes exist.
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1 Introduction
Any maritime nation, such as South Africa, has to ensure that access to its harbours
is maintained at all times. Even in the present political climate where the spectre of
war seems distant, the developing threat of asymmetrical warfare (very small factions
fight against large powers) and terrorist attack compels its military to ensure that all
avenues are investigated to ensure that maritime trade is not threatened by closure of
harbours through sea mines. The sea mine, which is a static, water-immersed device
containing an explosive and is intended to destroy enemy naval or merchant ships, has
been used extensively in modern warfare. However, the sea mine is not a new concept,
as a substance resembling a sea mine was used in Byzantium against an invading Muslim
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force in 673 AD [9], but its development improved rapidly during the two world wars. A
sea mine is positioned in the water by allowing it to drift, or it is moored or located on
the seabed. Aircraft, surface ship or submarine may position it. It is actuated by means
of control by a remote station, contact or by influence (e.g. magnetism, acoustics). It is
a device of strategic importance [10] used to protect shoreline assets like an entrance to a
harbour, and/or to harass or eliminate enemy sea traffic.
The combination of placing and countering mines is known as mine warfare. Since enemy
forces may place sea mines at one’s own strategic shoreline points, these sea mines must
be eliminated or avoided using countermeasures. Integer programming has been used to
determine a shortest route through a mapped sea minefield [2]. In this paper the focus is
on the countering of mines, using Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm in conjunction with
a genetic algorithm (GA).
This paper is structured in the following way: A brief overview of sea mine countermeasures
in §2 is followed by the definition of strategies for safest or shortest routing through a sea
minefield (§3) and an example of an implementation of these strategies (§4). In §5 the
balancing of risk and route length is explained. Risk factors other than sea mines add to
the problem of routing a ship, and some of these are discussed in §6 as an enhancement
to the risk function (developed in §3.2). Mine neutralisation is part of sea mine warfare,
and we propose the use of a GA in §7 to determine which sea mines in a mapped sea
minefield must be removed to construct a feasible route for a ship. We suggest areas of
further research in §8 and provide a summary and some conclusions in §9.
2 Brief overview of sea mine countermeasures
In this section we give a brief overview of sea mine countermeasures. Two accepted aspects
of mine warfare have not changed in modern times:
• the potential impact mines can have on maritime economies and naval operations
• the problem that countering mines remains extraordinarily more difficult than laying
them.
When applying passive countermeasures against mines, ships with a low signature are used
to avoid detonating mines. The signature consists of those signals emitted by a ship (e.g.
acoustic, magnetic, visual, infrared) that can be used by sensors to detect the presence or
position or other information about the ship. Low-signature ships have non-metallic hulls
to minimise magnetic effects and engines emitting low levels of noise to reduce acoustic
radiation.
On the other hand, active countermeasures include mine sweeping and mine hunting. In
the first approach, two ships connected with a special type of cable drag an area and cut
mooring mines from their tethers. This is a contact sweep, while a distance sweep induces
ship activities like noise and magnetism in the area to be cleaned. The mine hunting
approach is modern and more sophisticated than mine sweeping. Mines are located using
advanced technology (see, for example, [1] and [3]) and are marked or destroyed when
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detected. A modern development in mine countermeasures is to map minefields using
unmanned vehicles, which are either remotely controlled or autonomous. The resulting
maps, containing information on the environment (e.g. type of seabed, water depth, etc.)
and mine positions may then be used for detailed planning of the best way to neutralise
any mine threat. One way of reducing the threat is by avoiding the mines and transiting
the mapped minefield in such a way that a safe distance is kept from the mines at all times.
This approach is called mine avoidance and that is where the processes described in the
following paragraphs will find their application. If the minefield is not passable, it becomes
necessary to remove certain mines so that a safe route results. This optimisation process is
described in §7. It is assumed that the mapping process is accurate to an acceptable level
in both the classification of the type of seabed as well as the detection and classification
of other objects. If areas exist where the ability to detect a mine is below an acceptable
threshold, these areas are regarded as unsafe and are avoided.
3 Strategies for ship routing through a sea minefield
We develop strategies for routing a ship with minimum risk or finding a shortest route with
acceptable risk through a sea minefield in this section. This strategy comprises developing
a structure for ship routing, defining a risk function, and finding an optimal route through
a sea minefield. The decision maker may decide on a strategy in which the safest route is
followed, or the shortest route with some associated risk, or a strategy based on a trade-off
between risk and route length.
3.1 Defining a structure for ship routing
A routing structure to determine an acceptable route through a minefield is proposed
below. The area of interest is divided into a finite number of geometrically spaced nodes
(also known as vertices); this set of nodes is denoted by V . Hence, the elements of V are
ordered in the form of a grid in a plane. Arcs (also referred to as edges) interconnect these
nodes in a specific way along which travel is possible. The set of arcs is denoted by A.
These two sets are combined into a structure to form an unweighted graph G = (V,A).
The graph now defines possible routes that a ship may follow. Travel is possible along the
arcs in either direction. This is shown in Figure 1 for two nodes.
Since mine positions are not always exact, a safety area is defined around the mine that the
ship must avoid. For a single sea mine, the simplest way to define this area is to associate
it with its damage radius, which is mainly a function of warhead mass and vulnerability
of the vessel that is to transit past the mine. To ensure that no route passes more closely
than this distance from a mine, a safety radius, which is greater than or equal to the
damage radius is introduced into the routing structure (see Figure 2).
The resolution of the grid, i.e. the physical distance between nodes must also be consid-
ered. A fine grid is an advantage, but makes the problem much larger in terms of the
number of nodes to consider, while a coarse grid reduces the problem dimensions with a
loss of potential routes through the minefield. A preliminary experimentation with grid
spacing showed that a spacing approximately 10 times finer than the average mine spac-
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Figure 1: The routing structure and some nomenclature.
ing gave good results although a coarser spacing still provided acceptable results. For the
investigated minefields, this relates to a grid spacing of 50m where the best possible route
(lowest risk, or shortest route with acceptable risk) is required and 100m grid spacing
which results in an acceptable route with faster solution time. Further investigation into
the dependency between grid spacing and safety radius, as well as the effect of the actual
grid spacing size provides an interesting avenue of future research.
Next, the effect of the mines is included. This is achieved by adding their position and that
of their safety radius in the minefield. All nodes and connected arcs within the area formed
by the safety radius are removed as they represent travel through areas of unacceptable
risk. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The modified routing structure showing a mine and its safety area.
The quantification of the risk values to be assigned to the arcs, which will result in a
weighted graph G, is discussed in the next section.
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3.2 Defining a risk function
In mine avoidance, the challenge is to find a route through a mapped minefield that poses
the least risk to the transiting vessel. The way this risk is defined may be subjective, but
the optimisation of the route is required to be objective and scientifically sound. This risk
function may be determined by considering the following options:
• Define a function of the closest point of approach to the closest mine;
• Define a function of the closest point of approach to all mines.
It has been shown in [2] that the potential damage a sea mine can cause to a vessel is a
function of 1/R, where R is the linear distance between the vessel and the mine. In the
development of a risk function that will provide risk values to be associated with arcs,
we argued that risk is a function of the same form, but depending on the preference of
the decision maker, may be selected as proportional to 1/R or 1/R2 or indeed any other
inverse power of R. For that reason the risk factor has been made user selectable. Hence,
for an arc (i, j),
RiskCostij =
ArcLengthij
Rkmin
, (1)
where ArcLengthij denotes the length of arc (i, j), Rmin denotes the distance of closest
approach to the closest mine and k is user selectable (k ≥ 0), but likely to be either 1 or 2.
This causes the unit associated with risk to vary depending on the value of the exponent
k; its unit will be LengthUnit1−k.
There is a further argument that the risk of a particular arc may not depend only on the
closest mine to it, but in fact on the accumulated risk of all the mines. Naturally, the
closest mines will still have the greatest effect on the risk value, but for the hypothetical
case where there are two mines with equal closest point of approach to the arc, the risk
will be twice as high as for a single mine. For that purpose, the implementation has been
made user selectable, determined by whether the decision maker wishes to evaluate the
risk of all mines or the risk of the closest mine to the arc only. In the case of all mines
being considered, the risk associated with arc (i, j) is
RiskCostij = ArcLengthij ×
n∑
i=1
1
Rkimin
. (2)
The terms are similar to those in (1), but with Rimin the distance of closest approach to
mine i and where n denotes the number of mines in the minefield.
The risk values must be assigned to the arcs in the routing structure before an acceptable
route through the minefield can be determined. The principle of an arc being assigned a
risk value as a function of three mines is shown graphically in Figure 3. In the case of
Mine 1 in the figure, the shortest distance is the distance perpendicular to the arc. For
the other two mines, it is the distance between the node forming the end of the arc and
the mine position that gives the shortest distance. Thus, in the case of only the closest
mine being considered, the assigned risk will be a function of R2. If the risk is chosen to be
determined by all mines, it will be a function of R1, R2 and R3. It must be noted that the
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scale in the figure is not representative of an operational implementation, as the spacing
between nodes needs to be substantially smaller to achieve an acceptable solution.
Figure 3: Principle of assigning a risk value to an arc.
There are operational instances where the routes are required to be optimised with regard
to route length and not risk only. For this purpose, and that of evaluating the route
lengths, arcs are assigned a second weight or cost function which is based on their length.
This second attribute of an arc is thus taken to be its length only. In such cases arc cost
function is equated to arc length. Thus, for an arc (i, j),
LengthCostij = ArcLengthij . (3)
The decision maker must be allowed to adjust to ratios between the two extremes of
shortest route and safest route to make planning flexible. This necessitated a cost function
that takes into consideration both arc risk and arc length. If this is done, a risk weighting
may be applied to determine routes with different ratios of optimisation for risk and length.
If maximum risk is acceptable, the shortest route will result; if minimum risk is required,
the safest route results, taking only arc risk into consideration. As the two arc attributes
do not have the same unit, simple addition of the two attributes to determine a single cost
attribute for an arc is not possible.
Combining the two dissimilar attributes into one value may perhaps best be achieved
by linking them to a primary operational objective so that there is a direct relationship
between route risk and route length, so that:
OpsObjective = f(RouteRisk, PathLength). (4)
An approach was followed where the risk and length attribute of an arc is expressed in a
dimensionless way by transforming it into a ratio relative to the average attribute values
of all arcs in the grid. These ratios may then be used in the final (linear) cost function of
the arc (i, j),
ArcCostij = (1−RiskWeighting)×RiskRatioij+RiskWeighting×LengthRatioij , (5)
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where
RiskRatioij = RiskCostij/MeanRiskCostij , (6)
MeanRiskCostij =
1
N
N∑
l=1
RiskCostl, (7)
LengthRatioij = LengthCostij/MeanLengthCost, (8)
MeanLengthCost =
1
N
N∑
l=1
LengthCostl, (9)
and where N denotes the number of arcs in the entire grid.
RiskWeighting is selected by the decision maker and ranges between 0 and 1, both in-
clusive. It is evident that selecting 0 as RiskWeighting will result in the safest route by
optimising for route risk only, and selecting 1 will result in the shortest route by optimising
for route length only.
Any route through the minefield consists of a combination of connected arcs. The risk
value of that route is a function of the arc costs of the arcs that make up the route (see
(5)). Thus, for a route of N arcs starting at node r and ending at node s, the total
associated cost is
TotalRouteCostrs =
N∑
k=1
ArcCostk, (10)
where ArcCostk denotes the arc cost associated with the k− th arc in the route from node
r to node s.
3.3 Finding an acceptable route through a sea minefield
Finally, a method is required by which the best combination of arcs may be selected so
that the route with the smallest accumulated risk is chosen, irrespective of its length,
or the shortest route with acceptable risk. The problem to be solved is that of finding
a single source shortest path. This may achieved with Dijkstra’s algorithm for single
sources, where the arc cost (5) is substituted for arc length (for a complete discussion of
Dijkstra’s Algorithm see [8, pp. 491–494]). Dijkstra’s algorithm can be used to determine
the shortest route between a starting node and all other nodes in a network (known as a
‘one to many’ relationship). In a modified form it can be used to determine the shortest
distance between a chosen starting and end node (known as a ‘one to one’ relationship).
It can also be adapted to provide the shortest distance between all nodes (also known as a
‘many to many’ relationship). The algorithm is based on a systematic procedure whereby
adjacent nodes in a graph are examined, beginning with the start or end node and updated
sequentially each time a shorter route is found.
Dijkstra’s single source algorithm is executed as follows: Let V be a set of n nodes in a
graph, and with each node associate an auxiliary cost variable di ∈ D. Let cost(vj , vk)
denote the cost (e.g. distance or risk) to move from node vj to node vk. Initially, let
T = V , d1 = 0 and di = ∞, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n. During each iteration, the node vi ∈ T with
smallest cost di is removed. The cost dm of each neighbour vm of vi is updated if dm is
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greater than the existing cost. This process is iterated until all nodes have been removed
from T . When a node is removed from T , it is inserted into the set S, which is initially
empty. When the algorithm terminates, S contains the shortest routes from node v1 to
all other nodes in the graph. The algorithm is given in pseudo code in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Dijkstra
1: for each element in D do
2: di ←∞
3: end for
4: d1 ← 0
5: T ← V
6: S ← ∅
7: while T 6= ∅ do
8: u← Index of node in T with minimum dm
9: for each arc (vu, vm) outgoing from vu do
10: if dm > (du + cost (vu, vm)) then
11: dm ← du + cost (vu, vm)
12: end if
13: T ← T − vm
14: S ← S + vm
15: end for
16: end while
We now proceed with an example of the proposed strategies.
4 Application of the routing strategies: An example
In Figure 4 the application of the routing algorithm with arc cost (see (5)) replacing arc
length is shown in an academic example of a random minefield. The case is presented
where a ship has to enter a harbour (centre top of the graph) from anywhere in the
open sea (bottom of the graph) through 56 mines. The inverse, with the ship leaving the
harbour for the open sea, is equally represented by the example, as directionality has no
effect on the risk function. Two cases are presented with different safety radii and 50m
grid spacing values. For comparison, the shortest route (but with a higher risk) is also
shown in each case. This shortest route was obtained by the same routing algorithm using
a unit arc length.
5 Balancing risk and route length
Since shortest and safest routes represent two extremes in the optimisation procedure, the
decision maker may wish to choose a solution somewhere in between that allows for an
acceptable combination of route length and total risk. If the relationship between route
length and total risk is known, it may be preferable to make a small compromise with
regard to one parameter to achieve a substantial improvement on the other. The effect of
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Figure 4: Examples of the routes of minimum risk from the open sea (bottom) into a harbour
(top) through a random minefield with safety radius = 200m, grid spacing = 50m (for clarity only
every fifth grid point is shown).
the risk weighting for a specific minefield is shown in Figure 5 for two arbitrary values of
risk weighting (k = 2, see (5)). The results in Figures 6 and 7 are given for the academic
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case where safety radius is set to 0, to ensure the risk-return relationship is not influenced
by secondary factors. In the operational scenario where a safety radius greater than 0 is
introduced, it is evident that the risk-return relationship may be influenced by the choice
of this value even at low risk weighting settings.
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Figure 6: Routes for risk weighting setting = 0%, grid spacing = 50m, safety radius = 0m (for
clarity only every fifth grid point is shown).
A number of different routes were generated for the minefield shown in Figure 6 by varying
the percentage for which length and risk were optimized (see (5)). The results in Figure 8
show route attributes of risk and length, with risk weighting incremented by 2% from 1%
to 99% as well as the 0% risk weighting route (safest route).
The risk (Route Risk) and return (1/Route Length) for the above minefield were subse-
quently plotted against each other in Figure 9 to form an efficient frontier representing
return versus risk for the given minefield. Because a 100% risk setting results in a very
high total risk value, it distorts the efficient frontier and was thus not included in the plot.
The efficient frontier shows that a small sacrifice in terms of route risk gives a good
improvement in route length, whereafter a further sacrifice in risk has a progressively
smaller influence on route length. We conclude that a pure optimisation for route length or
route risk may not always be desirable. It may be acceptable or even preferable to include
a percentage of both attributes (risk and route length) so that a balanced route results.
This has to be done for each individual minefield by investigating the full relationship of
risk versus return, as was done here. The efficient frontier may be used to determine how
desirable a sacrifice may be, and what a good choice of risk weighting may be for that
minefield.
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6 Additional risk factors
The example described above uses the simplified risk function where arc risk consists only
of the risk that the mines present. In a real life operational situation many additional
risk factors may be posed by other threats, such as military threats (excluding mines),
environmental influences and own ship characteristics (e.g. the depth of the ship in the
water or ship draught, turning circles, manoeuvrability). Figure 10 shows the result when
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Figure 9: Efficient frontier for the minefield in Figure 6.
Figure 10: Shortest (A) and safest (B) routes through a minefield, considering environmental
factors (grid spacing 50% (100m), safety radius = 200m).
the routing strategies (shortest (A), and safest (B)) are applied to a fictitious harbour
where the environmental factors of water depth and seabed type have been included with
the mine risk. Certain seabed types make mine detection difficult (mud can cause burial,
a reef causes high reverberation, thus making detection difficult) and these areas have
to be avoided. As mines may potentially be found on the edges of these areas, a safety
area equal to the safety radius around such areas should be included in the danger area
definition. These areas, together with the danger areas of the mines, are shown in light
grey. Different routes result from changing safety radius and risk profiles.
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7 Near-optimal mine neutralisation
In the routing strategies described above, it is possible to come across a mined area where
no safe passage within acceptable risk is found (as assumed throughout this paper, the
positions of the mines are known through mapping). In such a case it becomes necessary
to clear mines selectively until a safe passage is found according to the proposed strategies
discussed in §3. If time is of importance in the breaching process, it is obvious that it
would be preferable to remove the minimum number of mines necessary in order to create
a sufficiently safe passage. The process to remove the optimum number of mines in the
best positions is a typical combinatorial optimisation problem. Although many different
approaches exist to solve combinatorial problems, the method described here uses a genetic
algorithm (GA).
The GA embodies an optimisation approach that mimics the principle of survival of the
fittest, found in nature. Solutions generated are not guaranteed to be the best, but if
correctly applied are expected to provide sufficiently good solutions. A predetermined
number of possible solutions to a problem are utilised, rather than a single instance,
each of which has a “genetic” makeup reflecting the specific solution. The best solutions
survive, and they may be modified by exchanging “genetic” material from other good
solutions or by randomly modifying parts of the genetic structure (a process referred
to as mutation). Subsequent generations, created by merging “genetic” material from
two good previous solutions, improve steadily until convergence is achieved. The first
step in applying a GA is to select a “genetic” coding method (called a chromosome) that
suitably represents a candidate solution. The second important aspect in GA optimisation
is to establish a fitness function by which the quality of a solution may be evaluated.
Both of these elements have to be determined to suit the characteristics of the specific
problem under consideration. Two chromosomes cross (or do not cross) according to the
crossover probability, while the “offspring” of both these possibilities may be subjected to
mutation. The latter procedure ensures that the algorithm escapes searches near possible
local optima. An offspring is randomly inserted into the population if it has a higher
fitness than the least fit chromosome in the population. Although a specific chromosome
might replace a fitter chromosome, the insertion process is aimed at increasing the average
fitness of the population, thus improving the population quality (and hence its ability to
“survive” the subsequent search iterations). The pseudo code for the GA is shown in
Algorithm 2 (for detailed discussions of a GA see, for example, [4] and [6]).
Suppose a mapped sea minefield contains n scattered mines. The genetic coding is im-
plemented by creating a string of genes equal to the number of mines, each mine number
being represented by its position in the string. If a mine were to be removed, the value
of the corresponding gene is 0; if the mine is present the value is 1. The fitness measure
is a function of the number of mines that have been removed (fewer is better) and the
resulting route length (a shorter route length is better). This implies that every member
of the population of solutions has to be evaluated for its route length and total risk, as
described in §3. The fitness function is defined as
f(L,M) =
2
L
Lb
+ MMm
, (11)
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where L is the route length resulting from a chromosome structure, where Lb is the length
of shortest possible route through the minefield in the absence of mines (L ≥ Lb), where
M ≥ 1 is the number of mines to be removed in a chromosome, and where Mn is the
minimum number of mines that can possibly be removed (Mn = 1 in this case).
Algorithm 2 Pseudo code for genetic algorithm
1: Generation ← 0
2: generate a random initial population
3: repeat
4: randomly select two different chromosomes from the population
5: if the crossover probability is satisfied then
6: of the two selected, set the chromosome with the best fitness function value to
be the first parent
7: choose a random chromosome from the population (different from the first
parent)
8: let the chromosome chosen in step 7 above be the second parent
9: perform crossover on the two parents, but generate only one offspring
10: else
11: choose any of the two parents to be the offspring
12: end if
13: for each gene in the offspring chromosome do
14: if mutation probability is satisfied then
15: invert the value of the gene (0 or 1)
16: end if
17: end for
18: evaluate the offspring chromosome with the fitness function, recording the result
19: if the fitness of the offspring is better than that of any chromosome in the
population then
20: replace a random chromosome in the population with the offspring chromosome
21: end if
22: Generation ← Generation + 1
23: until stopping condition is true
The best possible route length Lb is defined as the shortest distance between the departure
point of the ship and its destination, if there are no sea mines present. The value ofMm is
taken to be one, since that is the minimum number of mines to be removed so as to obtain
a safe route (if zero sea mines have to be removed, then the problem may immediately
be addressed by means of the strategies proposed in §3). It follows that the possible
values resulting from the fitness function are limited to the range [0; 1] and these values
are dimensionless. Note that we only consider the shortest route with acceptable risk
approach here, while the minimum risk approach (see §3) may also be followed. However,
this approach requires a greater computational burden during execution of the GA, and
implementing it is postponed as a topic for further research.
For initialisation, a random population is generated with an assignable number of mines
being removed from the minefield. Each member of the population is measured against
the fitness value resulting from the shortest route with acceptable risk optimisation and
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number of mines removed. The best solutions continue to reproduce for a number of
iterations (generations). Allowance has been made in the software developed for this study
for a minefield containing up to 100 mines, but in the results below, a minefield containing
80 mines is presented. The result for a random minefield that cannot be breached unless
mines are neutralised is shown in Figure 11.
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Figure 11: Safe ship route and sea mines to be neutralised following a GA optimisation (risk
weighting = 0%, grid spacing = 500m, safety radius = 100m, for clarity only every second grid
point is shown).
The mines that have to be removed are indicated by means of unfilled triangle symbols
in Figure 11. The performance of the GA that determined this solution is shown in
Figure 12. The chromosome length is 80 bits (representing 80 mines), and the population
size is determined to be 20 chromosomes when using a guideline as suggested in [7]. The
population size is kept constant throughout execution of the GA. Subsequent generations
were generated by selecting parents using the Roulette Wheel method (see, for example,
[4, pp. 48–49] and [6, p. 65]) and creating a new population of size equal to the original
population by means of a single point crossover using a crossover probability of 1.0. After
evaluation of the fitness of each new population member, the next generation is made up
of the population members with the highest fitness when evaluating the current generation
and its successor. In this way good old solutions are retained, while good new solutions
are incorporated into the parent population.
It is generally accepted that the mutation proportion must be in the order of 1/l where
l is the length of the chromosome (see, for example, [4, p. 135] and [6, p. 70]), thus the
mutation probability was set at 0.01.
The optimisation procedure reported above was repeated for the same random minefield
16 JF Bekker & JP Schmid 
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Figure 12: Convergence of the GA.
but with an increased safety radius. The results in Figure 13 show that more mines have
to be removed, which results in an entirely different route compared to the route suggested
in Figure 11. Thus, it is expected that with increasing mine density and safety radius the
mine neutralisation effort may become more difficult, but this has to be investigated by
further research.
8 Suggestions for further research
A GA was used in this study to determine a shortest route with acceptable risk through a
mapped sea minefield, but other approaches should also be considered, e.g. a tabu search
or the harmony search algorithm (see, for example, [5]). The risk function should be
explored further in terms of structure and composition. Environmental factors like water
depth and technical factors like a ship’s characteristics (turning circle, manoeuvrability,
etc.) should be considered in more detail for inclusion in the risk function. Due to the fact
that the problem size grows rapidly with the choice of a finer grid, the implication of an
adjustment of the grid size/resolution on the problem solution time should be investigated
thoroughly. Also, as mentioned in §3.1, the dependency (or otherwise) between the grid
spacing and safety radius should be determined.
9 Summary and conclusions
In this paper we briefly discussed sea mine warfare in general, while focussing on mine
countermeasures. We proposed strategies for the safest or fastest (shortest) routing of a
ship through a sea minefield. These strategies consist of three elements, viz. creating a
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graph analogy of the minefield to establish potential routes, quantifying risk by means of
a risk function, and finding the route with minimum risk or shortest route with acceptable
risk using Dijkstra’s single source algorithm. A route may also combine risk and route
length so that shorter routes with higher risks could be followed. The threat imposed on
a ship travelling through a sea minefield is increased when practical factors, e.g. seabed
type, water depth and the ship’s manoeuvrability, are added. Some sea minefields may
be impossible to penetrate due to relatively high density of mines and the accompanying
high risk, which requires that a number of mines be neutralised. We showed that a GA
can be used to determine a minimal number of mines to be removed so as to ensure a
route with an acceptable risk.
The process of sub-optimising safe transit through a mapped minefield has been demon-
strated. It shows that standard Operations Research techniques may be applied to the
problem while obtaining good results. Considering other techniques, such as tabu search,
may enhance the strategies proposed in this paper, and the risk function can be made more
practical by further improvement of risk quantification. The strategies may eventually be
developed into a routing tool with a wide area of application. 
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Figure 13: New route and mine removal plan for a larger mine safety radius (risk weighting =
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